Corporate Governance and Performance of Firms: An Empirical Evidence from the Banking Sector of Ghana

Nyarko, FK.; Yusheng, K.; Zhu, N.

Article abstract

Journal of Economics and International Business Management

Research Article | Published March 2017 | Volume 5, Issue 1, pp. 14-29

Corporate Governance and Performance of Firms: An Empirical Evidence from the Banking Sector of Ghana

Nyarko Felix Kwame^*

Kong Yusheng

Naiping Zhu

Email Author

School of Economics and Finance, Jiangsu University, 212000, China.

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Citation: Nyarko FK, Yusheng K, Zhu N (2017). Corporate Governance and Performance of Firms: An Empirical Evidence from the Banking Sector of Ghana. J. Econ. Int. Bus. Manage. 5(1): 14-29.

Abstract

The study investigates the relationship between corporate governance and the performance of banks in Ghana in terms of their financial performance. Primary and Secondary data were collected through the administration of interview questionnaires and from the Ghana Association of Bankers respectively. In analyzing the data, panel data methodology was used. The findings show that large board size, long serving CEOs, size of audit committee, audit committee independence, foreign ownership, institutional ownership, annual general meeting and dividend policy are positively related and associated with the financial performance of banks in Ghana. The banks are encouraged to adopt good corporate governance practices to improve on their financial performance and also protect the shareholders. Most importantly, the regulatory authorities must ensure compliance with good corporate governance and apply the appropriate sanctions for non-compliance to help the growth and development of the banking sector. The main contribution of the study to knowledge lies in its effort in strengthening corporate governance beyond the rights and responsibilities of different stakeholders in the management of a firm into areas involving the relationship between finance providers and a firm, compliance with legal, ethical and environmental needs of the society among others. This contribution has in no small way helped in enhancing my understanding about the interpretations which have shaped the corporate governance in relation with performance of the firm both in theory and practice.

Keywords Corporate Governance Firm Performance Ghana Association of Bankers

This article is published under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0

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